Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a consensus towardsusing a special-purpose Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcomingVehicular Communication (VC) systems. However, there are still severaltechnical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an important yet openchallenge is the acquisition of shortterm credentials, pseudonym: how shouldeach vehicle interact with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long?Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime? Answering thesequestions is far from trivial. Each choice can affect both the user privacy andthe system performance and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper,we make a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted question. Wecraft three generally applicable policies and experimentally evaluate the VPKIsystem performance, leveraging two large-scale mobility datasets. We considerthe most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisition policies; wefind that within this class of policies, the most promising policy in terms ofprivacy protection can be supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in allcases, this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that thestate-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with modest computingresources.
展开▼
