While fully device-independent security in BB84-like one way QKD isimpossible, it can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semidevice-independent scenario, where no assumptions on the characteristics of thehardware used are made except for the communication channel for which an upperbound on capacity is put. This approach is meaningful especially in the contextof recent {\it quantum hacking} attacks in which the eavesdroppers are able toremotely alter the behaviour of the devices used by the communicating parties.They are however unable to change the capacity of the channel. In this work we study a semi device-independent protocol wherein theknowledge of success probability of the associated dimension witness and theobserved efficiency of the detectors ($\eta_{avg}$) are sufficient to determinethe security. We consider practically possible, individual attacks with andwithout eavesdropper having access to quantum memory. We find criticaldetection efficiencies required for security in both cases.
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机译：尽管不可能像BB84那样以完全独立于设备的安全性QKD，但可以保证在与半设备无关的情况下不会遭受单独的攻击，在这种情况下，不对所用硬件的特性做任何假设，除非通信通道的上限是容量。这种方法尤其有意义，尤其是在最近的{\ it Quantum hacking}攻击中，窃听者能够远程更改通信方使用的设备的行为。但是，它们无法更改信道的容量。在这项工作中，我们研究了半独立于设备的协议，其中相关维证人成功概率的知识和检测器的观测效率（$ \ eta_ {avg} $）足以确定安全性。我们认为在可能的情况下，有和没有窃听者的个人攻击都可以访问量子内存。我们发现两种情况下安全性都需要关键的检测效率。
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