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Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions

机译:以日前统一价格重新审视最低利润条件   电力拍卖

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摘要

We examine the problem of clearing day-ahead electricity market auctionswhere each bidder, whether a producer or consumer, can specify a minimum profitor maximum payment condition constraining the acceptance of a set of bid curvesspanning multiple time periods in locations connected through a transmissionnetwork with linear constraints. Such types of conditions are for exampleconsidered in the Spanish and Portuguese day-ahead markets. This helpsdescribing the recovery of start-up costs of a power plant, or analogously fora large consumer, utility reduced by a constant term. A new market model isproposed with a corresponding MILP formulation for uniform locational priceday-ahead auctions, handling bids with a minimum profit or maximum paymentcondition in a uniform and computationally-efficient way. An exactdecomposition procedure with sparse strengthened Benders cuts derived from theMILP formulation is also proposed. The MILP formulation and the decompositionprocedure are similar to computationally-efficient approaches previouslyproposed to handle so-called block bids according to European market rules,though the clearing conditions could appear different at first sight. Bothsolving approaches are also valid to deal with both kinds of bidssimultaneously, as block bids with a minimum acceptance ratio, generalizingfully indivisible block bids, are but a special case of the MP bids introducedhere. We argue in favour of the MP bids by comparing them to previous modelsfor minimum profit conditions proposed in the academic literature, and to themodel for minimum income conditions used by the Spanish power exchange OMIE.
机译:我们研究了清理日前电力市场拍卖的问题,其中每个投标人,无论是生产者还是消费者,都可以指定最低获利者最大付款条件,从而限制接受一组投标曲线,该投标曲线跨越具有线性约束的输电网络连接的多个时段。例如,在西班牙和葡萄牙的日间市场中就考虑了这类条件。这有助于描述发电厂或类似大型消费者的启动成本的回收,其固定期限减少了。提出了一种新的市场模型,并采用了相应的MILP公式,以进行统一的地点价格日前拍卖,以统一且计算有效的方式处理具有最低利润或最高付款条件的投标。还提出了一种精确分解程序,该程序使用源自MILP公式的稀疏增强的Benders切口。 MILP公式和分解过程类似于先前提议的根据欧洲市场规则处理所谓的大宗投标的计算有效方法,尽管清除条件乍看之下可能会有所不同。两种解决方案也可以同时处理两种投标,因为具有最低接受率的整体投标(通常是不可分割的整体投标)只是此处介绍的MP投标的特例。我们通过将MP出价与学术文献中提出的最低利润条件的先前模型以及西班牙电力交易所OMIE所使用的最低收入条件的模型进行比较来主张MP出价。

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