The operation of the power grid is becoming more stressed, due to theaddition of new large loads represented by Electric Vehicles (EVs) and a moreintermittent supply due to the incorporation of renewable sources. As aconsequence, the coordination and control of projected EV demand in a networkof fast charging stations becomes a critical and challenging problem. In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic based decentralized controlmechanism to alleviate negative impacts from the EV demand. The proposedmechanism takes into consideration the non-uniform spatial distribution of EVsthat induces uneven power demand at each charging facility, and aims to: (i)avoid straining grid resources by offering price incentives so that customersaccept being routed to less busy stations, (ii) maximize total revenue byserving more customers with the same amount of grid resources, and (iii)provide charging service to customers with a certain level ofQuality-of-Service (QoS), the latter defined as the long term customer blockingprobability. We examine three scenarios of increased complexity that graduallyapproximate real world settings. The obtained results show that the proposedframework leads to substantial performance improvements in terms of theaforementioned goals, when compared to current state of affairs.
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