In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrumholders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wirelessservice providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes tostimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. Asbuyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to betterserve their end users. In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consistingof the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of thethree parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies tooptimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms ofboth demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. Wedesign FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamicsupplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc notonly maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties suchas truthfulness and computational tractability.
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