Elements of Trust in Named-Data Networking

摘要

In contrast to today's IP-based host-oriented Internet architecture,Information-Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes content by making it directlyaddressable and routable. Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is aninstance of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation Internetarchitecture. By opportunistically caching content within the network (inrouters), NDN appears to be well-suited for large-scale content distributionand for meeting the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungryapplications that dominate today's Internet. One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each content object to bedigitally signed by its producer. Thus, NDN should be, in principle, immune todistributing fake (aka "poisoned") content. However, in practice, this posestwo challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers: (1) overhead due tosignature verification and certificate chain traversal, and (2) lack of trustcontext, i.e., determining which public keys are trusted to verify whichcontent. Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify contentsignatures, which makes the architecture susceptible to content poisoningattacks. This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for, content poisoningattacks in NDN. In the process, it becomes apparent that meaningful mitigationof content poisoning is contingent upon a network-layer trust managementarchitecture, elements of which we construct while carefully justifyingspecific design choices. This work represents the initial effort towardscomprehensive trust management for NDN.