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How big is too big? Critical Shocks for Systemic Failure Cascades

机译:有多大太大了?系统性故障级联的关键冲击

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摘要

External or internal shocks may lead to the collapse of a system consistingof many agents. If the shock hits only one agent initially and causes it tofail, this can induce a cascade of failures among neighoring agents. Severalcritical constellations determine whether this cascade remains finite orreaches the size of the system, i.e. leads to systemic risk. We investigate thecritical parameters for such cascades in a simple model, where agents arecharacterized by an individual threshold \theta_i determining their capacity tohandle a load \alpha\theta_i with 1-\alpha being their safety margin. If agentsfail, they redistribute their load equally to K neighboring agents in a regularnetwork. For three different threshold distributions P(\theta), we deriveanalytical results for the size of the cascade, X(t), which is regarded as ameasure of systemic risk, and the time when it stops. We focus on two differentregimes, (i) EEE, an external extreme event where the size of the shock is ofthe order of the total capacity of the network, and (ii) RIE, a random internalevent where the size of the shock is of the order of the capacity of an agent.We find that even for large extreme events that exceed the capacity of thenetwork finite cascades are still possible, if a power-law thresholddistribution is assumed. On the other hand, even small random fluctuations maylead to full cascades if critical conditions are met. Most importantly, wedemonstrate that the size of the "big" shock is not the problem, as thesystemic risk only varies slightly for changes of 10 to 50 percent of theexternal shock. Systemic risk depends much more on ingredients such as thenetwork topology, the safety margin and the threshold distribution, which giveshints on how to reduce systemic risk.
机译:外部或内部冲击可能导致由许多代理组成的系统崩溃。如果电击最初仅击中一个代理并导致其失败,则可能在相邻代理之间引发一系列故障。几个关键星座确定此级联是保持有限还是达到系统的大小,即导致系统风险。我们在一个简单的模型中研究此类级联的关键参数,其中代理通过单个阈值\ theta_i确定其处理负载\ alpha \ theta_i的能力(其中1- \ alpha是其安全裕度)来表征。如果代理失败,则它们将负载平均分配给常规网络中的K个相邻代理。对于三个不同的阈值分布P(\ theta),我们得出级联大小X(t)的分析结果,该大小被认为是系统风险的度量,并且它停止的时间也是如此。我们关注两个不同的制度,(i)EEE,外部极端事件,其中冲击的大小是网络总容量的数量级;(ii)RIE,随机内部事件,其中冲击的大小是网络的总容量我们发现,即使在假定幂律阈值分布的情况下,即使对于超出网络容量的大型极端事件,仍然有可能实现有限级联。另一方面,如果满足关键条件,则即使很小的随机波动也可能导致完全级联。最重要的是,我们证明“大”冲击的大小不是问题,因为系统风险仅在外部冲击变化10%到50%时才略有变化。系统性风险更多地取决于诸如网络拓扑,安全裕度和阈值分布之类的要素,这为如何降低系统性风险提供了提示。

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