We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to obtain wirelessconnectivity by using a set of base stations (BS) as a non-cooperative game.Each radio device aims to maximize its own spectral efficiency (SE) in twodifferent scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BSselection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use several BSs (BSSharing). In both cases, we show that the resulting game is an exact potentialgame. We found that the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE)while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide fully decentralizedalgorithms which always converge to a NE in both games. We analyze the price ofanarchy and the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally, weobserved that depending on the number of transmitters, the BS selectiontechnique might provide a better global performance (network spectralefficiency) than BS sharing, which suggests the existence of a Braess typeparadox.
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