This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis ofa new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulateintervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, andprove its existence in a finite intervention game. We apply our framework toresource sharing scenarios in wireless communications, whose non-cooperativeoutcomes without intervention yield suboptimal performance. We deriveanalytical results and analyze illustrative examples in the cases of imperfectand perfect monitoring. In the case of imperfect monitoring, interventionschemes can improve the suboptimal performance of non-cooperative equilibriumwhen the intervention device has a sufficiently accurate monitoring technology,although it may not be possible to achieve the best feasible performance. Inthe case of perfect monitoring, the best feasible performance can be obtainedwith an intervention scheme when the intervention device has a sufficientlystrong intervention capability.
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