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On the Windfall and Price of Friendship: Inoculation Strategies on Social Networks

机译:论友谊的意外收获与价格:接种策略   社交网络

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摘要

This article investigates selfish behavior in games where players areembedded in a social context. A framework is presented which allows us tomeasure the Windfall of Friendship, i.e., how much players benefit (compared topurely selfish environments) if they care about the welfare of their friends inthe social network graph. As a case study, a virus inoculation game isexamined. We analyze the corresponding Nash equilibria and show that theWindfall of Friendship can never be negative. However, we find that if thevaluation of a friend is independent of the total number of friends, the socialwelfare may not increase monotonically with the extent to which players carefor each other; intriguingly, in the corresponding scenario where the relativeimportance of a friend declines, the Windfall is monotonic again. This articlealso studies convergence of best-response sequences. It turns out that insocial networks, convergence times are typically higher and hence constitute aprice of friendship. While such phenomena may be known on an anecdotal level,our framework allows us to quantify these effects analytically. Our formalinsights on the worst case equilibria are complemented by simulations sheddinglight onto the structure of other equilibria.
机译:本文研究了将玩家嵌入社交环境中的游戏中的自私行为。提出了一个框架,该框架使我们能够衡量“友谊的意外收获”,即,如果玩家在社交网络图中关心朋友的福利,他们会从中获得多少收益(相对于自私的环境)。作为案例研究,检查了病毒接种游戏。我们分析了相应的纳什均衡,并表明“友谊的失败”永远不会为负。但是,我们发现,如果一个朋友的评价不依赖于朋友的总数,那么社交福利就不会随着玩家相互关心的程度而单调增加。有趣的是,在朋友的相对重要性下降的相应情况下,意外收获又是单调的。本文还研究了最佳响应序列的收敛性。事实证明,在社交网络中,融合时间通常较长,因此构成了友谊的代价。虽然这些现象可能在轶事级别上是已知的,但我们的框架允许我们通过分析来量化这些影响。我们对最坏情况均衡的形式见解得到了其他均衡的结构模拟的补充。

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