The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view thevoters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus isdeeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance:a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one ofthe nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It isknown that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In thispaper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of severalCondorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalizeYoung's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance.We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcetconsensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensusclass and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We provethat, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hardwinner determination problem.
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