I nuovi tunnel ferroviari del Frejus e deludGottardo: un confronto politico-istituzionale

摘要

Projects of the two new railway transalpine tunnel of Frejus andudGothard have similar technical characteristics: an identical lengthud(57 km), a similar cost (10 billion Euros) and the existence of audhighway along the same Alpine corridor.udBut, whilst the new Gothard is now under construction andudshould become operational in 2017, the new Frejus is at standstilludat preliminary phases and has faced a very strong local oppositionudon the Italian side of the Alps.udThis difference can be explained by analysing the political andudinstitutional framework of the two projects.udThe new Swiss tunnel is integrated into a national scheme ofudtransport policy which is based on: the development of a newudsystem of railway infrastructures, which features two newudtransalpine tunnels (the new Gothard and the Loetschberg);udthe implementation of a distance-related heavy vehicle fee, whichudis levied on the basis of total weight, emission level and theudkilometres driven; the provision of financial resources to stimulateudthe transfer of transalpine freight from road to railway.udThe approval of such a scheme started twenty years ago: it wasudbased on a constitutional decree, implemented through severaludFederal acts and supported by three confirmatory referenda.udThe new French-Italian infrastructure is not integrated in anyudtransport policy scheme.udThe new tunnel is only partially consistent with the overalludgoals of the European transport policy and the TransportudProtocol of the Alpine Convention (which has not yet beenudratified by the Italian Parliament): actually no action for modaludshift is envisaged. Moreover, the new tunnel was initiallyudsupported by a structured consultative and participativeudprocedure – based on the ‘débat public’ technique – only inudFrance.udIn Italy this megaproject was not backed by an effectiveuddeliberation process, neither at the local nor the national level;udon the contrary: it was considered among the strategicudprojects of the so-called ‘Legge obiettivo’ and therefore itudcould bypass the ordinary administrative procedures (andudthe otherwise mandatory environmental impact assessment).udThe late creation of a consultative committee (the so-calledud‘Commissione Virano’) and the implementation of participativeudprocedures have not been always consistent and has notudproved valid to stop the fierce opposition to the project.