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Village economic autonomy and authoritarian control over village elections in China: evidence from rural Guangdong Province

机译:中国乡村经济自治与村民选举的独裁控制:来自广东农村的证据

摘要

This thesis investigates the effects of village economic wealth and economic autonomy on the authoritarian control of local government over village elections in China. With new data - qualitative evidence and quantitative data collected from the extensive fieldtrips to a county in Guangdong Province, this study finds that given that village elections operate within China’s one party authoritarian regime and the official purpose of the elections is to solve the grassroots governance crisis, local government have the incentive to control the elections in their favour, that is, to have udincumbents and/or party members elected. Using the election of party members to the village committee chairman position and the re-election of incumbent chairmen as proxies for the inclusiveness and contestation dimensions of village elections, this udstudy demonstrates that collective village wealth triggers fierce electoral competition, as collective village wealth represents the lucrative benefits candidates can obtain from holding the office. However, the success of authoritarian control hinges on village economic autonomy - the opportunities for economic development beyond the control of local government. If economic resources are controlled by local udgovernment, economic development might strengthen the capacity of local government to control the elections in their favour. Even if opponents win the elections, they are inclined to be co-opted by the local government - becoming party members, because their economic gain and maintenance of power are affected by the authoritarian local government control over economic resources. In most villages in the sample, authoritarian control prevails in village elections. The findings of this thesis suggest that until now the elections have been maintained within the boundary of the CCP’s authoritarian governance. In rural China, for elections to serve the function of promoting democracy and fostering checks and balances of power - neither manipulation by the local government nor manipulation by rich opponents - the key lies in the economic empowerment of villagers.
机译:本文研究了乡村经济财富和经济自主权对中国地方政府对乡村选举的独裁控制的影响。借助新数据-定性证据和定量数据,这些数据是从对广东省某县的广泛实地考察中收集到的,该研究发现,鉴于乡村选举在中国的一党专制政权范围内进行,而选举的正式目的是解决基层治理危机,地方政府有动力控制有利于选举的选举,即选举 udumcumups和/或党员。利用村民委员会主席的党员选举和现任主席的连任作为村庄选举的包容性和竞争性维度的代理,这一研究表明,集体村民财富引发了激烈的选举竞争,因为集体村民财富代表着候选人可以通过任职而获得丰厚的收益。但是,威权控制的成功取决于村庄的经济自主权,即村庄地方政府无法控制的经济发展机会。如果经济资源由地方政府控制,则经济发展可能会增强地方政府控制选举的能力。即使反对派赢得选举,他们也倾向于被地方政府选为党派,因为他们的经济收益和维持权力受到地方政府对经济资源的独裁控制的影响。在样本中的大多数村庄中,专制控制在村庄选举中占主导地位。本文的发现表明,迄今为止,选举一直保持在中共专制统治的范围内。在中国农村,要使选举发挥促进民主和促进权力制衡的作用-既不是地方政府的操纵,也不是富裕的对手的操纵-关键在于赋予村民经济权力。

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    Luo Ting;

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  • 年度 2014
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