Essays on the theory of the firm: Interactions between capital, product and labour markets.

摘要

This thesis examines some strategic interactions between financial, labour and industrial contracts signed by the manager of a firm with different stakeholders. It investigates the strategic effects of contractual or institutional arrangements when the firm faces commitment problems. The general introduction briefly surveys the relevant literatures on the methodology, modern theories of the firm, commitment problems and interactions between markets through the firm. The second chapter focusses on interactions between labour markets and the market for corporate control. It argues that the possibility of takeovers may affect the economic consequences of union power in wage negotiations: while union power increases wage flexibility and the firm's capacity to invest in the absence of takeovers, it decreases them when takeovers are allowed. Various takeover defence mechanisms are compared. The third chapter analyzes the impact of competition among downstream firms on a supplier's investment and on her incentive to vertically integrate. Tougher competition decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the supplier's negotiation position. In particular, the supplier is better off encouraging competition when the downstream firms have high bargaining power. We analyze the interactions between downstream competition and vertical integration. The fourth chapter (joint with Dr. Antoine Faure-Grimaud, LSE) analyzes the financing decisions of a monopolist facing a buyer whose valuation is private information. It develops the idea that a high level of (renegotiable) debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the high valuation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase the monopolist's expected profit. The benefit from the strategic use of debt increases with the durability of the good.