首页> 外文OA文献 >Setting the rules: Private power, political underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance
【2h】

Setting the rules: Private power, political underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance

机译:制定规则:全球货币和金融治理中的私权,政治基础和合法性

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

The role of private market agents in global monetary and financial governance has increased as globalization has proceeded. This shift in both markets and patterns of governance has often been encouraged by states themselves in pursuit of liberalization policies. Much of the literature views these developments in a positive light, yet there are other aspects of these developments that also merit attention. This article supports its central propositions with two cases of emerging global financial governance processes: the Basel II capital adequacy standards for international banking supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions-based transnational regulatory processes underpinning the functioning of cross-border securities markets. Based on the case findings, the article argues first that private sector self-regulation and/or public-private partnership in governance processes can leave public authorities vulnerable to dependence on the information and expertise provided by private agents in a fast-moving market environment. Policy in the vital domain of financial regulation has been increasingly aligned to private sector preferences to a degree that should raise fears of bureaucratic capture. Second, the article contends that the overall outcome in terms of global financial system efficiency and stability has been mixed, bringing a range of important benefits but also instability and crisis for many societies to a degree that has led to challenges to global governance itself. The case material indicates that the input, output and accountability phases of legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance are highly problematic, and much of the problem relates to the way in which private market agents are integrated into the decision-making process. Third, the article posits that a better consideration of these three 'phases' of legitimacy and their interrelationships is likely to enhance the political underpinnings and legitimacy of global financial and monetary order.
机译:随着全球化的发展,私人市场代理人在全球货币和金融治理中的作用日益增强。市场和治理模式的这种转变通常是国家自己为追求自由化政策所鼓励的。许多文献都以积极的眼光看待这些事态发展,但是这些事态发展的其他方面也值得关注。本文通过两个新兴的全球金融治理流程案例来支持其中心命题:国际银行监管的巴塞尔协议II资本充足标准以及基于证券委员会国际组织的跨国监管流程,这些流程支撑了跨境证券市场的运作。基于案例研究结果,文章首先提出,在治理过程中,私营部门的自我监管和/或公私伙伴关系可能会使公共机构容易受到依赖于在瞬息万变的市场环境中私人代理提供的信息和专业知识的影响。在金融监管的重要领域中的政策已越来越多地与私营部门的偏好保持一致,在某种程度上应该引起对官僚主义被俘的恐惧。其次,该文章认为,就全球金融体系的效率和稳定性而言,总体结果参差不齐,给许多社会带来了一系列重要的好处,但也带来了不稳定和危机,从而给全球治理本身带来了挑战。案例材料表明,全球货币和金融治理中合法性的输入,输出和问责阶段存在很大问题,并且大部分问题与将私人市场代理人纳入决策过程的方式有关。第三,文章认为,更好地考虑合法性的这三个“阶段”及其相互关系可能会增强全球金融和货币秩序的政治基础和合法性。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号