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Liquidity Benefits from IPO Underpricing : Ownership Dispersion or Information Effect

机译:IpO抑价的流动性收益:所有权分散或信息效应

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摘要

Our study investigates by which channels IPO underpricing impacts post-listing liquidity. Using a sample of IPOs undertaken on Euronext with diverse mechanisms, we show that when ownership structure is not influenced by initial underpricing, this underpricing still has a positive impact on aftermarket liquidity by a virtuous cycle related to analyst coverage.The analyst coverage purchased by initial underpricing reduces information asymmetry costsand illiquidity in the secondary market. The public information produced by analysts has astatistically more significant impact on adverse selection costs than on the proportion ofinformed traders in the market.
机译:我们的研究调查了IPO抑价的哪些渠道会影响上市后的流动性。使用在泛欧交易所进行的具有各种机制的IPO样本,我们表明,当所有权结构不受初始定价过低的影响时,这种定价过低仍然会通过与分析师覆盖率相关的良性循环对售后市场流动性产生积极影响。定价过低降低了二级市场上的信息不对称成本和流动性不足。分析师产生的公共信息对逆向选择成本的影响要比对知情交易者在市场中所占比例的影响具有统计意义上更大的影响。

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