Great captains and the challenge of second order technology: operational strategy and the motorisation of the British Army before 1940

摘要

No one worked harder on his own image than BernardMontgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notableBritish Second World War commanders. Less well-known isRichard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregardfor publicity. They were two very different types ofpersonality. Both, however, demonstrated command skillsand operational strategic insights which enabled them tocompensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armourin 1940. They were able to use what they had - simplemotorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped conceptsof logistical employment, which they replaced withbeneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomeryduring the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate thatadvantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers oron superior or inferior armaments. It may have to relyas much - if not more - on the personalities of thecommanders.