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The impact of prices on boundedly rational decision makers in supply chains

机译:价格对供应链中有限理性决策者的影响

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摘要

This PhD thesis was motivated by the simple observation that the objectives of distinct supply chain managers are often conflicting. This problem is usually addressed via supply chain contracts that are designed to align the incentives of the different supply chain partners to the overall benefit of the entire supply chain, when seen as a whole. In this way, the long-term prosperity and viability of all the firms that participate in the supply chain can be ensured. In order to study the efficiency of different supply chain contracts in attaining the theoretical optimum performance, there exist a number of standard normative models that predict the decisions of perfectly rational decision makers. But supply chain partners might in reality not make the perfectly rational decisions that these theoretical models predict. This may be because they may lack the required information, or experience cognitive limitations and individual preferences or have only a finite amount of time available. For this reason, they might have to settle at satisficing choices. The result of these ‘boundedly rational’ decisions is a real world of different than expected interactions. Since in this world the standard normative models retain limited predictive power, this PhD thesis aims to explore the true efficiency of the simplest supply chain contract that can exist, namely, the wholesale price contract. In addition, this PhD thesis provides some useful recommendations that aim to help supply chain managers make price and order quantity decisions that would be better aligned with the interests of the overall supply chain. To this end, this study applies an original approach that supplements experiments with human subjects with Agent Based Simulation experiments. In greater detail, informal pilot sessions with volunteers were first conducted, during which knowledge of the underlying decision making processes was elicited. Appropriate Agent Based Simulation models were subsequently built based on this understanding. Later on human subjects were asked to interact with specially designed versions of these Agent Based Simulation models in the laboratory, so that their consecutive decisions over time could be recorded. Statistical models were then fitted to these data sets of decisions. The last stage of this approach was to simulate in the corresponding Agent Based Simulation models all possible combinations of decision models, so that statically accurate conclusions could be inferred. This approach has been replicated for both the simple newsvendor setting and the beer distribution game. The results that are obtained indicate that the overall efficiency of the wholesale price contract differs significantly from the theoretical prediction of the corresponding standard normative models. It varies greatly and depends largely on the interplay between the pricing and ordering strategies that the interacting supply chain partners adopt. In view of this, real world echelon managers are advised to use prices as an effective mechanism to control demand and, also, keep their total supply chain profits in mind when making their respective decisions.
机译:这个博士论文的动机是简单的观察,即不同的供应链管理者的目标经常相互冲突。通常通过供应链合同来解决此问题,该合同旨在使不同供应链合作伙伴的激励措施与整个供应链的整体利益相统一(从整体上看)。这样,可以确保参与供应链的所有公司的长期繁荣和生存能力。为了研究不同供应链合同在实现理论上的最佳绩效方面的效率,存在许多标准的模型来预测完全理性的决策者的决策。但是,供应链合作伙伴实际上可能没有做出这些理论模型所预测的完全理性的决定。这可能是因为他们可能缺乏所需的信息,或者经历了认知上的局限和个人喜好,或者只有有限的可用时间。因此,他们可能不得不选择令人满意的选择。这些“有限理性”决策的结果是现实世界中的互动与预期不同。由于在这个世界上,标准的规范模型保留了有限的预测能力,因此本博士论文旨在探讨可能存在的最简单的供应链合同(即批发价格合同)的真实效率。此外,本博士学位论文提供了一些有用的建议,旨在帮助供应链经理制定价格和订单数量的决策,以更好地符合整个供应链的利益。为此,本研究采用了一种原始方法,即通过基于Agent的模拟实验补充人类受试者的实验。更详细地讲,首先与志愿者进行了非正式的试点会议,在此期间,人们了解了基本的决策过程。基于此理解,随后构建了适当的基于代理的仿真模型。后来,人类被要求在实验室中与这些基于Agent的仿真模型的特殊设计版本进行交互,以便可以记录他们随时间的连续决策。然后将统计模型拟合到这些决策数据集。这种方法的最后一步是在相应的基于Agent的仿真模型中模拟决策模型的所有可能组合,以便可以推断出静态准确的结论。这种方法已被复制到简单的新闻摊贩设置和啤酒分发游戏中。获得的结果表明,批发价格合同的整体效率与相应的标准规范模型的理论预测存在显着差异。它差异很大,并且在很大程度上取决于相互作用的供应链合作伙伴采用的定价和订购策略之间的相互作用。有鉴于此,建议现实世界中的梯队经理将价格用作控制需求的有效机制,并在制定各自的决策时牢记他们的供应链总利润。

著录项

  • 作者

    Dimitriou Stavrianna;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2010
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 English
  • 中图分类

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