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What drives European spinoff value effects? : impact of corporate governance, information asymmetry, and investor irrationality on firm values

机译:是什么推动了欧洲衍生价值效应? :公司治理,信息不对称和投资者非理性对公司价值的影响

摘要

The thesis explores the magnitude and determinants of spinoff value effects using robust methodologies and different theoretical perspectives. From a sample of 170 European spinoffs in the period 1987-2005, I find that spinoff announcement returns are significantly positive while the long-run shareholder value performance of postspinoff firms is insignificant when the cross-sectional return dependence problem is controlled. This is consistent with market efficiency overall in relation to spinoffs. However, this overall efficiency may conceal irrational investor behaviour towards certain types of spinoffs. Assuming investor irrationality, I examine whether investor sentiment affects spinoff wealth effects and spinoff decisions. I use four different proxies to measure investor demand for corporate focus and glamour stocks, and observe a positive association between these proxies and spinoff announcement returns. In addition, I find that offspring, born of spinoffs to cater to investor demand for glamour stocks, significantly underperform various benchmarks including the performance of less glamourous offspring. An improvement in operating efficiency of post-spinoff firms may not be realised if post-spinoff firms have weak corporate governance and agency conflicts are not mitigated. I investigate this issue by examining changes of corporate governance mechanisms around spinoffs. I observe that spinoff firms with a controlling family shareholder have higher announcement stock returns but lower post-spinoff performance than others. Moreover, controlling family shareholders generally reduce their stock ownership in post-spinoff firms, indicating that they may undertake spinoffs to reshuffle their wealth portfolios. I also find that board monitoring and takeover threats for post-spinoff firms positively affect the long-run performance of post-spinoff firms. This thesis further inspects the relationship between information asymmetry between the pre-spinoff parent and the stock market, and spinoff value effects. By employing four different information asymmetry proxies, I find no evidence that a spinoff resolves information asymmetry problems. In contrast, I document some evidence that the information asymmetry problem may be exacerbated following spinoffs when the liquidity of post-spinoff firms is decreased. Taken together, my findings suggest that managers and shareholders should assess the desirability of a spinoff more carefully and take investor irrationality into account. This is the first study that focuses on European spinoffs over a long period and tests various theories concerning the sources of value. It also provides the first time empirical evidence on the validity of the catering theory in the context of spinoffs.
机译:本文运用稳健的方法和不同的理论视角探讨了附带价值效应的大小和决定因素。从1987年至2005年期间的170项欧洲分拆样本中,我发现,如果控制横截面收益依赖问题,则分拆公告公司的长期股东价值绩效微不足道。这与剥离相关的整体市场效率是一致的。但是,这种整体效率可能掩盖了不合理的投资者行为对某些类型的衍生产品的影响。假设投资者不理性,我研究了投资者情绪是否会影响衍生资产的影响和衍生决策。我使用四种不同的代理来衡量投资者对公司重点股票和魅力股票的需求,并观察这些代理与衍生公告收益之间的正相关关系。此外,我发现,为满足投资者对魅力股的需求而产生的衍生产品后代,其表现明显逊色于各种基准,包括性能较差的后代。如果衍生后公司的公司治理薄弱且代理冲突无法缓解,则衍生后公司的运营效率可能无法实现。我通过研究围绕分拆的公司治理机制的变化来研究此问题。我观察到,拥有家族控股股东的分拆公司比其他公司拥有更高的公告股票收益率,但分拆后的表现却更低。此外,控股家族股东通常会减少分拆后公司的股票所有权,这表明他们可能会进行分拆以重组其财富组合。我还发现,对衍生后公司的董事会监控和收购威胁对衍生后公司的长期业绩产生了积极影响。本文进一步考察了衍生前母公司与股票市场之间信息不对称与衍生价值效应之间的关系。通过采用四种不同的信息不对称代理,我发现没有证据表明分拆可以解决信息不对称问题。相反,我记录了一些证据,表明分拆后公司的流动性下降时,分拆后信息不对称问题可能会加剧。综上所述,我的发现表明,经理和股东应更仔细地评估剥离的可取性,并考虑投资者的非理性。这是第一项长期关注欧洲衍生产品并测试各种与价值来源有关的理论的研究。它还提供了关于附带条件下餐饮理论有效性的首次经验证据。

著录项

  • 作者

    Sudarsanam P S; Qian Binsheng;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2006
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 English
  • 中图分类

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