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Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm

机译:不可分割项目的双人公平划分:一种高效,无羡慕的算法

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摘要

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in which any item named by both players in the same round goes into a “contested pile,” AL may reduce, or even eliminate, the contested pile, allocating additional or more preferred items to the players. The allocation(s) that AL yields are Pareto-optimal, envy-free, and maximal; as the number of items (assumed even) increases, the probability that AL allocates all the items appears to approach infinity if all possible rankings are equiprobable. Although AL is potentially manipulable, strategizing under it would be difficult in practice.
机译:对于在两个参与者之间划分一组不可分割项目这一古老问题,已经提出了许多程序。我们提出了一种与布拉姆斯和泰勒(BT)提出的算法有关的新算法(AL),该算法仅要求玩家严格按照从最佳到最差的顺序对项目进行排名。与BT不同,在BT中,两个玩家在同一回合中指定的任何项都进入“有争议的筹码”,AL可以减少甚至消除有争议的筹码,为玩家分配更多或更多的偏好项。 AL产生的分配是帕累托最优,无羡慕和最大的;随着项目数量(假设为偶数)的增加,如果所有可能的排名均等,则AL分配所有项目的可能性似乎接近无限。尽管AL可能是可操纵的,但在实践中很难制定策略。

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