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Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate

机译:在任命过程中讨价还价,约束代表团和参议院的政治权重

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摘要

The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate's ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.
机译:总统和参议院就关键政府部门负责人的任命进行讨价还价。该部门的运营部门拥有有关其运营环境的私人信息。我们将任命过程建模为将决策权委派给运营单位(机构)。当参议院与该机构足够接近时,总统必须赋予该机构更多的权力。另一方面,考虑到参议院的理想观点,当信息更加精确时,总统可以加强授权范围。

著录项

  • 作者

    Semenov Aggey;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2008
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"English","id":9}
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