The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their assumption that the parties split the renegotiation surplus 50:50. If the generalized Nash bargaining solution is applied, then for any pair of valuations that the two parties may have, there exist bargaining powers such that either ownership by the government or by the NGO can be optimal.
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机译：政府和非政府组织（NGO）可以投资提供公共物品。在一个不完整的契约框架中，Besley and Ghatak（2001）认为，最重视公共利益的政党应该是所有者。我们表明该结论基于他们的假设，即当事各方将重新谈判盈余按50:50分配。如果应用广义的纳什议价解决方案，则对于两方可能具有的任何一对估值，都存在议价能力，使得政府或非政府组织的所有权都可以最优。
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