British foreign policy decision-making towards Palestine during the Mandate (1917-1948): a poliheuristic perspective

摘要

This thesis is chiefly concerned with understanding the reasons behind British foreign policy towards Palestine between the invasion in December 1917 and final withdrawal in May 1948. It applies Poliheuristic Decision (Ph) Theory to British Cabinet decision-making at four critical junctures in foreign policy decision-making during this time period, arguing that contrary to the established literature on Mandate Palestine, British Cabinet policy reflected a stark lack of viable alternatives that left little room for consideration of personal biases, allegiances or sentimental attachment to either Zionism or Arab nationalism during the decision-making process. This reveals how crucial decisions concerning the future of Palestine were frequently more concerned with fighting narrow, domestic or broader, international political battles than preventing or dealing with a burgeoning conflict in a tiny strip of land on the Mediterranean. In so doing, this thesis aims to elucidate previously neglected areas of the British Mandate for Palestine as well as highlight some of the problems with Ph theory as a bridging framework between Rational Choice and cognitive models, while contributing new and innovative case studies to the field of Foreign Policy Analysis.