An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

摘要

IntroductionThe question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of historyis currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition ofthe thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around theintersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnectedissues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historicalage how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer thisconcern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we cometo an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use arethemselves historically enveloped?But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology hasdredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, reallyneglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges ofwilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain thingsof our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important2to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simplyderail the possibility for historical understanding.Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did notquestion the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treatingknowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true,or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different factsand generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not justdetermining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledgecould make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of"historical anarchy"!'Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wantedto answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem ofhistoricism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societalpresuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetratingto the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the pastwhich was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from thepresent. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of themeaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merelyontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology byII13including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does thisin order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily forhim includes the question of the Being of history.One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we getfrom historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into ascience. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role ofhistory is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing onhistoricality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception ofhistory and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger'sBeing and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, weshall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in theconception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conceptionmeans for a contemporary historical understanding.The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individuallyhas been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivistinterpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discovermetaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Manythinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truthin an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We4-. - - - -exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity ofthe age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do weactually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this ascommunal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal?Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thusovercoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historicalhorizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemologicalconcern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects ametaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within theontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus therecan be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical",Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith-Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger'ssolution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just asubjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universalmeasures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger'snotion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-thingsas well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality isexplicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des Seins).