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Analysis of the effects of abolishment of planting rights in the European Union on the wine sector in Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany

机译:分析欧盟废除种植权对德国莱茵兰-普法尔茨州葡萄酒业的影响

摘要

The production and marketing of wine in the European Union (EU) are governed by the Common Market Organization (CMO) of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Since 1976, a crucial point of the CMO with respect to wine has been the regulation of wine production by the system of the planting rights. Consistent with the goal of increasing the competitiveness of EU wine producers on the world market, the 2008 CAP reform included the liberalization of the planting rights regime by 2018 the latest. As a result of intense discussions on the EU and EU Member states levels, the planting rights system has recently been converted into a scheme of authorizations for vine plantings, which is valid until 2030.This dissertation investigates the effects of abolishment of planting rights on the largest wine-producing region in Germany, Rheinland-Pfalz. For this purpose a comparative static regional partial net-trade equilibrium model that includes the output of a Markov chain projection was used. The model simulates the future distribution of vineyards in Rheinland-Pfalz among wine farm groups according to size classes and area type, the demand for standard and basic quality wine must in Germany and production of standard and basic quality wine must in Rheinland-Pfalz.The policy simulation model was run for scenarios of different levels of market prices of wine must, different land rental prices, restricted and liberalized planting rights, and a scheme of authorizations for vine plantings. The results revealed that the effects of liberalization of planting rights and of a scheme of authorizations for vine plantings depend on profitability of standard and basic quality wine must production. In particular, if standard and basic quality wine must production is profitable for at least one wine farm group, and planting rights are liberalized, production of standard and basic quality wine must and, respectively, acreage of vineyards in Rheinland-Pfalz will increase with respect to the demand for these two types of wine must in Germany and availability of land suitable for vine growing. If production of basic and standard quality wine must is profitable and planting rights regime is retained or converted into a scheme of authorizations for vine plantings, the acreage of vineyards in Rheinland-Pfalz might reach the maximum defined by the policy regime. In addition, newly established vineyards will be used for production of either standard or basic quality wine must depending on which type is more profitable. Movement of vineyards within the wine farm groups will take place only if at least one of the farm groups receives positive economic profits. Land for vine growing will be distributed to the farm groups which are profitable and characterized by positive growth rates in the past. The abolishment of planting rights will have minor or no effects on the wine sector in Rheinland-Pfalz, if production of basic and standard quality wine must is not profitable. Similarly, movement of vineyards within the wine farm groups will not take place, if none of the farm groups receive positive economic profits.This dissertation provided an empirical examination of the effects of restricted and liberalized planting rights, as well as a scheme of authorizations for vine plantings on the wine sector in Rheinland-Pfalz. It has also supplemented the literature on how policy reforms with regard to the limitation of agricultural production input use in order to control the output affect the agricultural production sector.
机译:欧盟(EU)中葡萄酒的生产和销售受欧盟共同农业政策(CAP)的共同市场组织(CMO)监管。自1976年以来,CMO关于葡萄酒的关键点一直是通过种植权制度对葡萄酒生产进行监管。与提高欧盟葡萄酒生产商在世界市场上的竞争力的目标一致,2008年的CAP改革包括最迟在2018年实现对种植权制度的自由化。由于在欧盟和欧盟成员国之间进行了激烈的讨论,最近将种植权制度转换为藤本植物种植授权计划,该计划有效期至2030年。本文研究了取消种植权对葡萄种植的影响。德国最大的葡萄酒产区莱茵兰-普法尔茨州。为此目的,使用了一个比较静态的区域局部净贸易均衡模型,该模型包括马尔可夫链投影的输出。该模型根据规模类别和区域类型,德国对标准和基本质量葡萄酒的需求以及莱茵兰-普法尔茨州生产标准和基本质量葡萄酒的需求,模拟了莱茵兰-普法尔茨州各葡萄酒农场集团之间葡萄园的未来分布。针对不同的葡萄酒市场价格水平,不同的土地租赁价格,受限和自由化的种植权以及葡萄种植授权方案运行了策略模拟模型。结果表明,放开种植权和实施葡萄种植授权计划的效果取决于标准和基本质量葡萄酒必须生产的获利能力。尤其是,如果至少一个酒庄集团必须生产标准和基本质量的葡萄酒是有利可图的,并且放开了种植权,则必须增加标准和基本质量的葡萄酒的生产,以及莱茵兰-普法尔茨州葡萄园的种植面积对这两种葡萄酒的需求必须在德国以及适合葡萄种植的土地供应上。如果生产基本质量和标准质量的葡萄酒必须是有利可图的,并且保留了种植权制度或将其转换为葡萄种植许可计划,则莱茵兰-普法尔茨州的葡萄园面积可能达到政策制度所定义的最大值。此外,根据哪种类型更有利可图,新建立的葡萄园将用于生产标准或基本质量的葡萄酒。仅当至少一个酒庄集团获得正的经济利润时,葡萄园才会在酒庄集团中移动。葡萄种植用的土地将分配给有利可图的农场群体,这些农场过去的特点是正增长。如果生产基础质量和标准质量的葡萄酒必须不赚钱,那么取消种植权将对莱茵兰-普法尔茨州的葡萄酒业产生很小的影响或没有影响。同样,如果没有一个农场集团能获得正的经济利润,也不会在葡萄酒农场集团内部进行葡萄园的迁移。本论文对限制和自由化种植权的影响以及授权计划进行了实证研究。莱茵兰-普法尔茨州葡萄酒业的葡萄种植。它还补充了有关为限制农业生产投入使用而进行政策改革以控制产量如何影响农业生产部门的文献。

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