On the Role of Probability in Humeu27s Imagination and Associationism: a Bayesian Response to Fodoru27s Hume Variations

摘要

In his 2003 book Hume Variations, Jerry Fodor argues the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has obviated the need for Humeu27s associationism and faculty of imagination. Contrary to Fodor, in this paper I argue that contemporary Bayesian models of cognitive science suggest that Hume’s account continues to comprise a viable theory of mental operations. I propose a Bayesian interpretation of Humeu27s associationism wherein the u22liberty of the imagination to transpose and change its ideasu22 is accounted for by the contributions of randomness, noise, or stochasticity--i.e., probability.If my analysis is on track, Fodor has misconstrued the Humean mind by interpreting Humeu27s fundamentally graded and probabilistic cognitive architecture in terms of the crisp formal logic required by the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). I show how the probabilistic Bayesian interpretation thus developed might allow the Humean to address Fodor’s objections.