The Reemergence of Kantian Ethics: Have We Adequately Responded to Hegelu27s Objections?

摘要

The philosophies of Kant and Hegel have experienced a renaissance for the past thirty years, and a debate continues as to whether Hegelu27s objections to Kantu27s moral philosophy are sound, and/or whether Hegelu27s ethics are an improvement on Kantu27s. This debate takes many forms, and most recently, theorists have been interested in measuring Hegelu27s objections against contemporary theories following in the Kantian tradition. u27Critics,u27 (theorists defending Hegelu27s moral point of view) suggests such reconstructed theories leave themselves open to identical criticisms Hegel wielded at Kant almost 200 years ago. u27Defenders,u27 (theorists supporting Kantu27s moral philosophy, or a revised version) reply in one of two ways. They either suggest that Hegelu27s criticisms of Kant are unwarranted, meaning Hegel misinterprets Kantu27s ideas and/or purposes; or, they maintain that Kantu27s ethics are vulnerable to Hegelu27s objections, however some newer version of Kantu27s ethics is not because it has been purged of those Kantian elements which Hegel attacks. Clearly, both views render Hegelu27s critique of Kant obsolete. So, why are we witnessing such an aggressive resurgence of Hegelian-styled arguments in the contemporary literature?In seeking to answer this question, this thesis reconsiders Hegelu27s actual critique of Kant. In this way, the thesis falls into a specific category of political philosophy. It is a study in the u27history of ideas.u27 Rather than considering the question of whether contemporary Critics or Defenders have the better argument concerning the merit of reconstructed Kantian theories, I intend to re-evaluate the soundness of Hegelu27s objections to Kantian ethics.Kantu27s moral and political thought on the proper ordering of society is deeply embedded in the pluralist democracies of the western world. As such, those Kantian ideas/elements should be defendable against Hegelian criticisms.Following an in-depth consideration of Hegelu27s critique of Kant, I argue that whereas Hegel accurately identifies weaknesses in the system of Kantu27s moral philosophy, his critique does not successfully achieve its goal. It does not show that Kantu27s ethical theory is an inadequate prescription for the rational agent seeking to act morally. Rather, it serves as a warning of the dangers inherent in democratic liberal theory.