Explanation, prediction, causation – an unholy trinity? Appreciative comments on Philosophy and Methods in Political Science

摘要

In this short udbut critical appreciation of Keith Dowding’s seminaludPhilosophy and udMethods in Political ScienceudI reflect on the distinctive treatment of both realism and explanation udin contemporary political science that its author offers, expressing rather more sympathudy for the udformer than the latter. I welcome his critique of the use and misuse of ‘isms’ in much of the udexisting literature, whilst pointing to some potential inconsistencies; I accept his broad and udinclusive understanding of philosophic realism; and I prudaise Dowding for putting the question of udexplanation ud–udand its adequacy ud–udat the heart of the philosophy of political science (where I think udit belongs). Yet I reject the idea that prediction is or, indeed, should be central to all social udscientific explaudnation. Similarly I take issue with the contention that we are typically distracted udby questions of causation, suggesting that the presentation of a ‘credibly causal’ narrative is the udcrux of adjudicating good from bad explanation. I explore the implicatudions of such a position and udconclude with comments on Dowding’s call for the reproducibility and transparency of data.