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Overcoming the Downs-Thomson Paradox by transit subsidy policies

机译:通过过境补贴政策克服Downs-Thomson悖论

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摘要

Consider a competitive highway/transit transportation system in which travelers either drive on the bottleneck-constrained highway or take scheduled trains from home to the workplace in the morning peak hours. This paper explores the impact of bottleneck capacity expansion on transit operating schemes (fleet size and fare) and travelers’ departure time and mode choices. Due to the potential occurrence of the Downs-Thomson (D-T) Paradox after highway capacity expansion, the paper investigates whether the D-T Paradox can be circumvented by implementing transit subsidy policies. The effects of different transit subsidy schemes are explored: subsidizing the transit company (cost subsidy) or the passengers (passenger subsidy) with the financial support from either government funding or road pricing revenue. For each combination of subsidy method and financial sourcing, the condition for overcoming the D-T Paradox is established.
机译:考虑一个竞争性的高速公路/过境运输系统,在该系统中,旅客要么在瓶颈受限的高速公路上行驶,要么在早上高峰时段乘坐定时火车从家中到达工作场所。本文探讨了瓶颈容量扩展对公交运营方案(车队人数和票价)以及旅客出发时间和方式选择的影响。由于高速公路通行能力扩容后可能会产生唐斯-汤姆森悖论,因此本文研究了通过实施公交补贴政策是否可以规避D-T悖论。探讨了不同的过境补贴方案的效果:在政府资金或道路定价收入的财政支持下,对过境公司(成本补贴)或乘客(乘客补贴)进行补贴。对于补贴方法和财务采购的每种组合,都确立了克服D-T悖论的条件。

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