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Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty

机译:决策权的优化配置与不确定条件下的激励机制

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摘要

Incentives for managers are often provided by offering them performance-based compensation schemes. The efficiency of such monetary compensations, however, depends on several factors, among them the quality of the employed performance measures, the information available for contracting purposes, and the allocation of decision-making authority which translates into either more centralized or more decentralized organizational structures. This article investigates a firm's decision whether to delegate or retain the authority to decide on a specific job design in a moral hazard environment with asymmetric information on effort costs. It provides conditions under which decentralization is the preferred organizational form. Moreover, it derives the result that the relation between incentives and the delegation of decision-making authority is not univocal, but depends on the quality of the employed performance measure. In this regard, it contributes to explaining the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between incentives and decision-rights.
机译:通常通过向管理人员提供基于绩效的薪酬计划来提供激励措施。但是,这种货币补偿的效率取决于几个因素,其中包括所采用绩效指标的质量,可用于订约目的的信息以及决策权限的分配,这些权限转化为更集中或更分散的组织结构。本文研究了企业是否委托或保留在道德风险环境中采用特定的工作成本信息来决定特定工作设计的权限的决定。它提供了权力下放是首选组织形式的条件。而且,得出的结果是,激励与决策权下放之间的关系不是明确的,而是取决于所采用绩效指标的质量。在这方面,它有助于解释关于激励与决策权之间关系的混合经验证据。

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