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Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market

机译:滥用德国电力市场的支配地位和反垄断执法

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摘要

In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5,000 MW generation capacity as well as its extra-high voltage network. We analyze the effect of these divestitures on German wholesale electricity prices. Our identification strategy is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods when demand is high. Therefore, a decrease in market power should lead to convergence between peak and off-peak prices. Using daily electricity prices for the 2006 - 2012 period and controlling for cost and demand drivers, we find economically and statistically significant convergence effects after the implementation of the Commission's decision. Furthermore, the price reductions appear to be mostly due to the divestiture of gas and coal plants, which is consistent with merit-order considerations. Placebo regressions support a causal interpretation of our results.
机译:2008年,欧盟委员会对一家大型的垂直整合电力公司E.ON进行了调查,调查其涉嫌通过战略性地压制发电能力而滥用共同的主导地位。在E.ON同意撤出5,000兆瓦的发电能力及其超高压网络后,该案得到了解决。我们分析了这些资产剥离对德国批发电价的影响。我们的识别策略基于以下观察结果:在需求旺盛的高峰时段,能源供应商拥有更多的市场力量。因此,市场支配力的下降将导致峰值和非峰值价格之间的趋同。通过使用2006年至2012年期间的每日电价并控制成本和需求驱动因素,我们发现在执行委员会的决定后,经济上和统计上都将产生显着的趋同效应。此外,价格下降似乎主要归因于天然气厂和煤炭厂的资产剥离,这与绩效顺序考虑相一致。安慰剂回归支持我们的结果有因果关系。

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