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Is the revolving door of Washington a back door to excess corporate returns?

机译:华盛顿的旋转门是企业回报过剩的后门吗?

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摘要

In this paper, we look into the so-called "revolving door of Washington", which is the movement of individuals between federal government positions and jobs in the private sector, and examine its link to long-run stock returns. We find that firms where current public officials become future employees outperform other firms by a statistically significant 7.43% per year in terms of four-factor alpha. This result is robust to different weighting methodologies and risk adjustments, and to plausible reverse causality arguments. We also show that firms receive more valuable government contracts from a government agency when a future firm employee is holding a post at that agency. Such financial gains are significantly reduced during periods in which presidential executive orders restrict revolving door movements. Our results are consistent with the notion that some public officials could be favoring certain companies while in office with a view to gaining future corporate employment.
机译:在本文中,我们研究了所谓的“华盛顿旋转门”,即个人在联邦政府职位和私营部门工作之间的移动,并研究了其与长期股票收益的联系。我们发现,就目前的公职人员而言,未来雇员的公司在四因素alpha方面的统计优势每年超过其他公司7.43%。该结果对于不同的加权方法和风险调整以及合理的反向因果关系参数均具有鲁棒性。我们还表明,当未来的公司雇员在该机构任职时,公司会从政府机构获得更多有价值的政府合同。在总统行政命令限制旋转门移动期间,这种财务收益会大大减少。我们的结果与以下观点一致:一些公职人员可能会在任职时偏爱某些公司,以期获得未来的公司就业。

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