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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants: An experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

机译:设计异质参赛者之间的竞赛:对全薪竞价中的抢七和竞价上限的实验研究

摘要

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid-caps significantly diminishes the discouragement effect. Bid-caps can also improve revenue. Most deviations from Nash equilibrium can be explained by the level-k model of reasoning.
机译:竞赛文献中一个众所周知的理论结果是,更大的异质性会由于“劝阻效应”而降低参赛者的表现。通过竞价上限和有利的打破平局规则来偏爱较弱的参赛者来平衡竞争环境,可以减少泄气的影响,并增加设计师的收入。我们在实验中测试了这些预测。我们的数据表明,确实,通过抢七局和竞价上限来加强实力较弱的竞争者会大大减少泄气的影响。出价上限还可以提高收入。与纳什均衡的大多数偏差可以通过k级推理模型来解释。

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