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Price and non-price competition in oligopoly: An analysis of relative payoff maximizers

机译:寡头垄断中的价格与非价格竞争:相对收益最大化的分析

摘要

Do firms under relative payoffs maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profile that results in tougher competition compared to firms under absolute payoffs maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where firms select a two dimensional strategy set of price and a non-price variable known as quality simultaneously. In conclusion, our results show that equilibrium solutions of RPM and APM are distinct. We further characterize the comparison between these two equilibrium concepts. In particular, RPM does not always lead to stricter competition compared to the Nash equilbrium (APM). In fact, the comparison between two equilibrium concepts is influenced by the parameters of demand curve and cost function. The conditions, derived in this paper, determine under which circumstances RPM induces more competition or less competition w.r.t the price or non-price dimension.
机译:与处于绝对收益最大化(APM)行为下的公司相比,处于相对收益最大化(RPM)行为下的公司是否总是选择一种导致竞争更加激烈的策略配置文件?在本文中,我们将通过一个对称寡头垄断的简单模型来解决这个问题,在该模型中,企业同时选择价格和非价格变量(称为质量)的二维策略集。总之,我们的结果表明RPM和APM的平衡解是不同的。我们进一步表征了这两个均衡概念之间的比较。特别是,与纳什均衡(APM)相比,RPM并不总是导致更严格的竞争。实际上,两个均衡概念之间的比较受需求曲线和成本函数的参数影响。本文得出的条件决定了在什么情况下RPM会在价格或非价格维度上引发更多竞争或更少竞争。

著录项

  • 作者

    Moghadam Hamed M.;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2015
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

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