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On the effect of prospective payment system on hospital efficiency and competition for patients in Germany

机译:论未来支付制度对德国医院效率与竞争的影响

摘要

The introduction of hospital reimbursement based on diagnosis related groups (DRG) in 2004 has been a conspicuous attempt to increase hospital efficiency in the German health sector. In this paper changes of hospital efficiency, quantified as a Malmquist index decomposition in pure technical efficiency change, are analyzed for periods before and after the reform. We implement a two-stage semi-parametric efficiency model that allows for spatial interdependence among hospitals. The results reveal an enhancement in overall efficiency after the DRG introduction. Moreover, an increase in the magnitude of negative spatial spillovers among German hospital performance can be diagnosed. This result is in line with a rise of competition for (low cost) patients.
机译:2004年引入了基于诊断相关人群(DRG)的医院报销,这是提高德国卫生部门医院效率的明显尝试。本文分析了改革前后的医院效率变化,以纯技术效率变化中的Malmquist指数分解来量化。我们实施了两阶段的半参数效率模型,该模型考虑了医院之间的空间相互依赖性。结果表明,引入DRG后,总体效率有所提高。此外,可以诊断出德国医院绩效中负空间溢出的数量增加。这一结果与(低成本)患者竞争的增加相吻合。

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