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Patents as quality signals? The implications for financing constraints on RD

机译:专利作为质量信号?融资约束对研发的影响

摘要

Information about the success of a new technology is usually held asymmetrically between the research and development (R&D)-performing firm and potential lenders and investors. This raises the cost of capital for financing R&D externally, resulting in financing constraints on R&D especially for firms with limited internal resources. Previous literature provided evidence for start-up firms on the role of patents as signals to investors, in particular to Venture Capitalists. This study adds to previous insights by studying the effects of firms' patenting activity on the degree of financing constraints on R&D for a panel of established firms. The results show that patents do indeed attenuate financing constraints for small firms where information asymmetries may be particularly high and collateral value is low. Larger firms are not only less subject to financing constraints, but also do not seem to benefit from a patent quality signal.
机译:有关新技术成功的信息通常不对称地保存在从事研究与开发(R&D)的公司与潜在贷方和投资者之间。这增加了用于外部研发的资本成本,从而导致研发资金受限,特别是对于内部资源有限的公司。以前的文献为创业公司提供了证据,证明专利在向投资者,尤其是向风险资本家发出信号方面的作用。这项研究通过研究公司的专利活动对一组成熟公司的研发活动的融资约束程度的影响,从而增加了以前的见解。结果表明,专利确实确实减轻了小型企业的融资约束,因为小型企业的信息不对称性可能特别高,而抵押品价值却很低。较大的公司不仅受融资限制的影响较小,而且似乎也没有从专利质量信号中受益。

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