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Quality provision and reporting when health care services are multi-dimensional and quality signals imperfect

机译:当医疗保健服务是多维的,质量信号不完善时,提供质量和报告

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摘要

We model competition for a multi-attribute service, like health care services, where consumers observe attribute quality imprecisely before deciding on a provider. High quality in one attribute is more important in terms of ex post utility. Attribute quality is stochastic, providers can shift resources in order to increase expected quality in some attributes. Consumers rationally focus on attributes depending on signal precision and beliefs about the providers' resource allocations. When signal precision is such that consumers focus weakly on the less important attribute, any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is inefficient. Increasing signal precision can reduce welfare, as the positive effect of better provider selection is overcompensated by the negative effect that a shift in consumer focusing has on provider quality choice. We discuss the providers' incentives for information disclosure.
机译:我们为诸如医疗服务之类的多属性服务竞争建模,消费者在决定提供者之前会不精确地观察属性质量。就事后效用而言,一种属性的高质量更为重要。属性质量是随机的,提供者可以转移资源以提高某些属性的预期质量。消费者根据信号精度和对提供商资源分配的信念合理地关注属性。当信号精度使消费者无法专注于次要的属性时,任何完善的贝叶斯纳什均衡都是低效的。信号精度的提高会降低福利,因为更好的提供商选择的积极影响被消费者关注焦点转移到提供商质量选择上的消极影响过度补偿。我们讨论了提供者进行信息披露的动机。

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