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License auctions with exit (and entry) options: Alternative remedies for the exposure problem

机译:带退出(和进入)选项的许可证拍卖:暴露问题的替代补救措施

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摘要

Inspired by some spectrum auctions, we consider a stylized license auction with incumbents and one entrant. Whereas the entrant values only the bundle of several units (synergy), incumbents are subject to non-increasing demand. The seller proactively encourages entry and restricts incumbent bidders. In this framework, an English clock auction gives rise to an exposure problem that distorts efficiency and impairs revenue. We consider three remedies: a (constrained) Vickrey package auction, an English clock auction with exit option that allows the entrant to annul his bid, and an English clock auction with exit and entry option that lifts the bidding restriction if entry failed.
机译:受某些频谱拍卖的启发,我们考虑了由现有人和一名参赛者组成的程式化许可证拍卖。进入者仅重视几个单位的捆绑(协同作用),而现任者的需求却没有增加。卖方积极鼓励入境,并限制现有的投标人。在这种框架下,英国时钟拍卖会引起曝光问题,从而影响效率并损害收入。我们考虑三种补救措施:(受约束的)Vickrey包裹拍卖,具有退出选项的英国时钟拍卖,允许进入者取消其投标;以及具有退出和进入选项的英国时钟拍卖,如果进入失败,则取消竞价限制。

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