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>Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Constraints in Multinational Enterprises u2013 An Analysis in Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013 u2013
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Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Constraints in Multinational Enterprises u2013 An Analysis in Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013 u2013
In our analysis, we consider the distribution of decision power over financing and investment between MNEs' headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and its influence on the foreign affiliates' financial restrictions. Our research results show that headquarters of multinational enterprises have not (yet) moved much decision power to their foreign subsidiaries at all. We use data from the IWH FDI Micro Database which contains information on corporate governance structures and financial restrictions of 609 enterprises with a foreign investor in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and East Germany. We match data from Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS database on financial characteristics. We find that a high concentration of decision power within the MNE's headquarter implicates high financial restrictions within the subsidiary. Square term results show, however, that the effect of financial constraints within the subsidiary decreases and finally turns insignificant when decision power moves from headquarter to subsidiary. Thus, economic policy should encourage foreign investors in the case of foreign acquisition of local enterprises to leave decision power within the enterprise and in the case of Greenfield investment to provide the newly established subsidiaries with as much power over corporate governance structures as possible.
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机译:在我们的分析中,我们考虑了跨国公司总部与外国子公司之间对融资和投资的决策权分配及其对外国子公司财务限制的影响。我们的研究结果表明,跨国企业总部尚未将决定权转移到国外子公司。我们使用来自IWH FDI微型数据库的数据,该数据包含有关在匈牙利,波兰,捷克共和国,斯洛伐克,罗马尼亚和东德的609家企业的外国投资者的公司治理结构和财务限制的信息。我们匹配了来自于Bureau van Dijk的AMADEUS数据库中有关财务特征的数据。我们发现,跨国公司总部内部决策权高度集中,意味着子公司内部的财务限制很高。平方项结果显示,但是,当决策权从总部转移到子公司时,子公司内部财务约束的影响减小,并且最终变得微不足道。因此,在外国收购外资企业的情况下,经济政策应鼓励外国投资者将决定权留在企业内部,而在绿地投资公司的情况下,则应鼓励外国投资者为新成立的子公司提供尽可能多的公司治理结构权力。
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