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When is it less costly for risky firms to borrow? Evidence from the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy

机译:借款风险较高的公司何时成本较低?来自银行风险承担的货币政策渠道的证据

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摘要

In an investigation of banks' loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades, this study finds supporting evidence for the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. We show that banks charge lower spreads when they lend to riskier borrowers relative to the spreads they charge on loans to safer borrowers in periods of low short-term rates compared to periods of high short-term rates. The interest discount that banks offer riskier borrowers when short-term rates are low is robust to borrower-,loan-, and bank-specific factors as well as to macroeconomic factors known to affect loan rates. The discount is also robust to bank-firm fixed effects. Finally, our tests that build on the micro information banks provide on their lending standards in the Senior Loan Officers Opinion Survey suggest the interest rate discount that riskier borrowers receive when short-term rates are low is bank driven.
机译:在对过去二十年中美国银行贷款定价政策的调查中,该研究发现了银行货币政策冒险渠道的支持证据。我们发现,与短期利率高的时期相比,银行向风险较高的借款人贷出的息差相对于短期利率低时向较安全的借款人收取的息差要低。当短期利率较低时,银行为风险较高的借款人提供的贴息对借款人,贷款和银行特定的因素以及已知会影响贷款利率的宏观经济因素具有较强的吸引力。折价对银行固定收益也很有效。最后,我们在高级信息官员意见调查中基于微型信息银行提供的贷款标准的测试表明,在短期利率较低的情况下,风险较高的借款人获得的利率折扣是银行驱动的。

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