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Dealing with a Liquidity Trap when Government Debt Matters: Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary and Fiscal Policy

机译:在政府债务重要时应对流动性陷阱:最佳时间一致的货币和财政政策

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摘要

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. In our model, while the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.
机译:保持政府债务可持续性的需求如何影响对流动性陷阱的最佳货币和财政政策反应?为了提供答案,我们使用名义利率为零的小型随机新凯恩斯模型,并描述了最佳的时间稳定策略。我们专注于两种政策工具,即短期名义利率和债务融资的政府支出。应对流动性陷阱的最佳政策对策主要取决于当前的债务负担。在我们的模型中,虽然政府支出的最佳金额随着未偿还政府债务的水平而下降,但未来的货币政策变得更加宽松,从而触发了私营部门预期的变化,从而有助于从一开始就抑制产出和通胀的下降。流动性陷阱。

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