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Courts of appeal, bureaucracies and conditional project permits: The role of negotiating non-exclusive property rights over the environment

机译:上诉法院,官僚机构和有条件的项目许可:谈判非专有财产权对环境的作用

摘要

Much of what may be coined the creeping degradation of the environment is due to economic projects which are subject to public approval. The erection of buildings, the siting of factories, all require permission from bureaucracies. To answer the question whether there is too much or not enough of the environment thus requires an analysis of the criteria under which private projects are publicly approved. An omnipotent and benevolent dictator will undertake an environmentally sensitive project under the safeguards of an optimal emission control if the public environmental costs are exceeded by the private net gains from the project, or so the story goes. To continue the tale, a benevolent bureaucracy possessing absolute authority over the use of the environment will permit projects, given optimal safeguards, if the same condition is fulfilled.
机译:造成环境恶化的原因很多可能是由于经济项目需要公众批准。建筑物的安装,工厂的选址,均需获得官僚机构的许可。要回答这个问题,即环境是否过多,就需要分析私人项目被公开批准的标准。如果项目的私人净收益超出了公共环境成本,那么无所不能和善意的独裁者将在最佳排放控制的保护下进行一项对环境敏感的项目。继续讲这个故事,如果对环境的使用拥有绝对的权力,那么一个仁慈的官僚机构只要满足相同的条件,就可以给予项目以最佳的保护措施。

著录项

  • 作者

    Mohr Ernst;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 1990
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

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