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Relative performance pay, bonuses and job-promotion tournaments

机译:相对绩效工资,奖金和职业晋升锦标赛

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摘要

Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We explain these empirical puzzles by combining job-promotion tournaments with higher-level bonus payments in a two-tier hierarchy. Moreover, we show that under certain conditions the firm implements first-best effort on tier 2 although workers earn strictly positive rents. The reason is that the firm can use second-tier rents for creating incentives on tier 1. If workers are heterogeneous, the firm strictly improves the selection quality of a job-promotion tournament by employing a hybrid incentive scheme that includes bonus payments.
机译:几项经验研究对锦标赛理论提出了挑战,他们指出(1)在等级级别内薪酬有很大差异;(2)晋升保费仅部分解释了等级工资差异;(3)在几乎任何等级级别上都可以观察到外部招聘。我们通过在两个层次的层次结构中结合工作晋升竞赛和更高级别的奖金来解释这些经验难题。此外,我们表明,在一定条件下,尽管工人获得严格的正租金,但该公司仍在第2层实施了最大的努力。原因是该公司可以使用第二层租金在第一层上创建激励机制。如果工人是异类,则该公司通过采用包括奖金支付的混合激励方案来严格提高工作晋升竞赛的选择质量。

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