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Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges

机译:中国的高管薪酬,公司业绩和公司治理:来自上海和深圳证券交易所上市公司的证据

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摘要

This paper provides evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on executive compensation and ownership structure, we find for the first time statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual cash compensation (salary and bonus) for top executives with respect to shareholder value in China. In addition, sales growth is shown to be significantly linked to executive compensation and that Chinese executives are penalized for making negative profit although they are neither penalized for declining profit nor rewarded for rising profit insofar as it is positive. Perhaps more importantly, we find that ownership structure of China's listed firms has important effects on pay-performance link in these firms. Specifically state ownership of China's listed firms is weakening pay-performance link for top managers and thus possibly making China's listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem. As such, ownership restructuring may be needed for China to successfully transform its SOEs to efficient modernized corporations and reform its overall economy.
机译:本文提供了有关高管薪酬与中国上市公司的公司绩效之间的关系的证据。利用1998年至2002年中国上市公司的综合财务和会计数据,再加上有关高管薪酬和所有权结构的独特数据,我们首次发现具有高管薪酬的高管人员的年度现金薪酬(薪金和奖金)具有显着的统计敏感性和弹性。尊重中国的股东价值。此外,销售额的增长与高管薪酬有着显着的联系,尽管中国高管既没有因利润下降而受到惩罚,也没有因利润上升而受到奖励,但他们却受到了负利润的惩罚。也许更重要的是,我们发现中国上市公司的股权结构对这些公司的薪酬绩效链接具有重要影响。具体说来,中国上市公司的国有所有权正在削弱高层管理人员的薪酬绩效链接,从而可能使中国上市公司在解决代理问题上的效率降低。因此,中国可能需要进行所有权重组,以成功将其国有企业转变为高效的现代化公司并改革其整体经济。

著录项

  • 作者

    Kato Takao; Long Cheryl;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2005
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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