Meaning theory and the problem of the acquisition of a first language.

摘要

The thesis begins by making two distinctions which areudcentral to its methodology. The first is that between validudand invalid criticism, the second between philosophy ofudlanguage and meaning theory. These distinctions combine toudproduce the methodology which informs the thesis, namelyudthat a theory of meaning can be validly criticised in termsudof its account, implicit or explicit, of first languageudacquisition and, conversely, an account of first languageudacquisition can be validly criticised in terms of itsudtheory, implicit or explicit, of meaning. The thesisudcontinues by testing the appropriateness of the methodologyudagainst the classical empiricist and rationalist accounts ofudmeaning expressed in terms of Ideas, arguing that theudmajority of criticisms of these accounts misfire as they doudnot operate within the framework of the positions theyudpurport to criticise. Such invalid criticism is replacedudwith that argued for here, the conclusion being that theudclassical accounts of meaning are to be rejected on theudgrounds that they make use of a phenomenon, language, whoseudacquisition they cannot, within the terms of their ownudposition, explain. Modern, post-Fregean, empiricist andudrationalist positions, those of Quine and Chomskyudrespectively, are then subjected to similar treatment. Bothudof these positions have explicit accounts of first language acquisition and so the conclusion to this section of theudthesis reverses that reached when discussing the classicaludpositions, in that the explanations of first languageudacquisition given by modern empiricists and rationalists areudbased on meaning theories which, for a variety of reasons,uddo not justify their explanations of the phenomenon of firstudlanguage acquisition.udIn an attempt to move towards a more positive position twoudalternative accounts of meaning theory, the formal and theuddescriptive, are then examined. The formal account,udDavidson's, is defended against those critics who produceudattacks centering upon its meaning theory as being, in theudsense described above, invalid. However, as it is thenudshown not to be able to account for first languageudacquisition, it is eventually rejected. The descriptivistudaccount is identified by tracing the development ofudWittgenstein's philosophy to support a particularudinterpretation of his later account of meaning as being auddescriptive one and a defence is offered to a number ofudcriticisms of that position. A poorly worked outudexperiential account of first language acquisition is thenudidentified, and this is developed further by introducing theudarea of non-linguistics, where meaning can be given withoutudwords. The thesis concludes by suggesting that this area'sudaccount of first language acquisition, although having audnumber of difficulties with its implied meaning theory, can be combined with the later work of Wittgenstein to produceudwhat is at least a descriptively adequate account of bothudmeaning and first language acquisition. Moreover, it pointsudto an area of enquiry where philosophical techniques can beudutilised to great effect so as to add new dimensions to