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Game analysis of product-service integration

机译:产品服务集成的博弈分析

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摘要

Purpose: This paper aims at defining the value creation mechanism and income distribution\udstrategies of product-service integration in order to promote product-service integration of a\udfirm.\udDesign/methodology/approach: This paper conducts researches quantitatively on the\udcoordination mechanism of product-service integration by using game theory, and uses the\udmethods of Shapley value and Equal growth rate to further discuss income distribution\udstrategies of product-service integration.\udFindings: Product-service integration increases the total income of a firm and the added value\udof the income δπ decreases as the unit price demand variation coefficient of products and\udservices E increases, while decreases as the marginal cost of products βP increases, decreases as\udthe marginal cost of services βS increases. Moreover, th e findings suggest that both income\uddistribution strategies of product-service integration based on Shapley value method and Equal\udgrowth rate method can make the product department and service department of a firm winwin\udand realize the Pareto improvement. The choice of what kind of distribution strategy to\udcoordinate the actions between departments depends on the department playing dominant role\udin the firm. Generally speaking, for a firm at the center of market, when the product\uddepartment is the main contributor to firm income, the service department will choose the\udincome distribution strategy of product-service integration based on Shapley value method;\udwhen the service department is the main contributor to firm income, the service departmentwill choose the income distribution strategy of product-service integration based on Equal\udgrowth rate method.\udResearch limitations/implications: This paper makes some strict assumptions such as\udcomplete information, risk neutral, linear cost function and so on and the discussion is limited\udto the simple relationship between product department and service department.\udPractical implications: Product-service integration enables a firm to improve its total income.\udA firm should take appropriate income distribution strategies in order to promote the its\udproduct-service integration.\udOriginality/value: This paper introduces game theory into the research of product-service\udintegration for the first time and it has reached some valuable conclusions, which has opened\udup a new field of study in the product-service area.
机译:目的:本文旨在定义产品-服务整合的价值创造机制和收入分配\策略,以促进a \ udfirm的产品-服务整合。\ ud设计/方法/方法:本文对\ udcoordination进行了定量研究。产品服务集成的博弈机制,并运用Shapley值和均等增长率的方法进一步讨论收入分配\产品服务集成的策略。\ ud结果:产品服务集成增加了公司的总收入收入δπ的增加值\ ud随着产品和服务ud的单价需求变化系数E的增加而减小,而随着产品的边际成本βP的增加而减小,而服务的边际成本βS的增加而减小。此外,研究结果表明,基于Shapley值法和均等率/增长率增长率的产品/服务集成的收入/分配策略都可以使公司的产品部门和服务部门实现双赢,并实现帕累托改进。选择哪种分配策略来\协调部门之间的行为取决于部门在企业中的主导地位。一般而言,对于以市场为中心的公司,当产品\部门是公司收入的主要贡献者时,服务部门将基于Shapley值法选择\产品/服务集成的\收入分配策略; \当服务时部门是公司收入的主要贡献者,服务部门将根据平等/增长率比率方法选择产品-服务集成的收入分配策略。\ ud研究局限/含意:本文对\ udcomplete信息,风险中性进行了一些严格的假设。 ,线性成本函数等,讨论仅限于\产品部门与服务部门之间的简单关系。\ ud实践意义:产品/服务集成可以使公司提高总收入。\ ud公司应采取适当的收入分配策略为了促进其\ udproduct-service集成。\ udOriginality / value:本文介绍了游戏的首次对产品服务/集成化的研究提出了有价值的结论,为产品服务领域开辟了新的研究领域。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zhong, Heping;

  • 作者单位
  • 年度 2014
  • 总页数
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类

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