This dissertation explores two key questions related to nuclear weapons programs: First, under what conditions do states decide to start nuclear weapons programs? And second, once states begin such programs, when and why do they vary the path and pace of their nuclear development?A state’s wealth and resources, and willingness to make the political decision to begin a nuclear weapons program, determine whether a government will decide to start down the path to nuclear weapons. Past scholarship has identified several different possible factors that increase a state’s risk of making the decision to start such a program. Using event history analysis, and including every country in the world starting in 1939, I demonstrate that elements of the security environment - particularly whether a state has a nuclear strategic rival - and prior nuclear reactor experience have the greatest effect on a state’s decision to start a program.Once a state begins a nuclear weapons program, what affects the path and pace of that program? I offer two main theories regarding this question and make the first scholarly attempt to model the paths of all nuclear weapons programs that have ever existed. I use event history models to conduct the statistical analysis. The models confirm both theories: First, the weaker a state’s civilian control over the military is, the less likely a state will be to accelerate the pace of its program. Second, the more independent a state’s nuclear bureaucracy is, the more likely a state will be to accelerate its nuclear weapons program. Finally, I explore the mechanisms underlying these theories in three historical case studies.
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