The article exposes the difficult position in which the East African Court ofJustice (EACJ) finds itself when faced with matters containing humanrights allegations, which the Court is barred from deciding as such. TheEACJ is often called upon to draw a line between what might constitute ahuman rights case and a claim relating to an East African Community(EAC) norm which is not barred under article 27(2) of the East AfricanCommunity Treaty. As the main judicial mechanism of the EAC, the EACJ isprimarily mandated to interpret and apply EAC law, of which humanrights form part. Despite the existing limitations, the EACJ has clearly laiddown its position that it cannot ‘abdicate’ exercising its interpretivemandate, even if a matter before it contains allegations of human rightsviolations. In doing so, the EACJ has indirectly protected human rights inthe EAC through other forms of cause of actions, such as the rule of lawand good governance. This contribution advances two key arguments:First, the EAC Treaty contains human rights norms that the EACJ cannotescape from interpreting. Second, due to the continuing restrictions inadjudicating human rights, as well as the existing human rights norms inthe EAC Treaty, the EACJ is trapped in precarious attempts to balance theadvancing of EAC norms, on the one hand, and adhering to the Treatyrestrictions in adjudicating human rights, on the other.
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