The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of banks, by providing empirical evidence of how specific dimensions of bank activity are affected by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Precisely, three different essays are conducted in order to help explaining some features of banks‘ functioning. In the first essay, we offer evidence on the relationships of bank ownership concentration with both risk and performance, in the presence of broad bank regulations and other country-level conditions that shape banking industry. In the second essay, we help to characterize bank lending practices through the assessment of the relative roles of three broad bank regulations, namely, (i) capital requirements, (ii) official supervision and (iii) external private monitoring, on the determination of risk terms of loan contracts. In the third essay, we provide evidence of the effectiveness of two dimensions of market discipline of banks: first, the market monitoring of banks through equity markets‘ price reactions to loan announcements, and second, the banks‘ responses to these market reactions in the direction of pursuing sound risk-taking practices
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