People\u27s war under modern conditions : an investigation into Chinese defence strategy, 1977-2049

摘要

This thesis is an investigation of the relevance of ‘people\u27s war’ to contemporary Chinese defence policy. This loose concept has been eroded by \u27modernity’, but a guerilla-based defence remains the essential theme. Prior to China\u27s acquisition of nuclear weapons, people\u27s war was the sole element of the state\u27s deterrent policy, aiming to swamp an invader with China\u27s numerical strength. In the 1980s and beyond people\u27s war finds effectiveness through a combination of materiel of middle range technology and the traditional usage of massive manpower. People\u27s war under modern conditions remains essentially defensive, but now incorporates \u27active defence’ with accent on greater mobility. However, the central thesis of this work relates to how the traditional strategy may influence nuclear doctrine. This thesis proposes that China could abandon long-range ballistic missiles and adopt a new concept in nuclear strategy: that of, Guerilla Nuclear Warfare. Trained in guerilla tactics and equipped with battlefield nuclear weapons, this would represent the logical extension of China\u27s people\u27s war strategy to the new nuclear conditions associated with superpower research into space-based ballistic missile defences and which, in full deployment, could nullify a Chinese nuclear deterrent based only on \u27mid-tech\u27 delivery systems. Guerilla Nuclear Warfare, as a strategy, would involve the irregular use of locally held and controlled tactical nuclear weapons, but it would also be a method of circumventing the proposed Soviet missile defence shield by not challenging it. Guerilla Nuclear Warfare does not exist in the late 1980s, but evidence exists to suggest its development. It cannot yet be proven as the new direction but China\u27s strategic circumstances add weight to available indications: unless the Strategic Defence programs of the established superpowers are arrested then it appears the sole option available to the Chinese for the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent in the early part of the 21st Century.